Abstract. In the context of the American federalism, integrated parties provide the necessary coordination mechanism for state and federal politicians to be electorally successful. This argument rests on the assumption that voters are able to observe the benefits of voting a straight ticket. We test for individual level explanations by using CCES data. Moreover, we measure the so-called 'two-sided' coattail effects in concurrent multilevel elections in the U.S. since 1960.
Introduction
These days, only eleven of the fifty gubernatorial races for state level executives in the United States are held on the first Tuesday in November, during Presidential election years 1 . The rest have gradually moved to off-year elections. The number of states electing their Governor in the 'on-year' started to decline dramatically in the beginning of the second half of last century ( Figure 1 ) -specially among those states holding gubernatorial elections every two-years -as a consequence of the decision of separating the state's chief executive elections from the federal arena (Tompkins, 1987) . This process of electoral differentiation was highly motivated by the seemingly observation that Governors were riding the so-called 'coattails' of their party's candidate for President (Bibby, 1983: 116) . The typical argument was that the effect of presidential coattails would constrain gubernatorial competition. By this logic races for the governorship would be dominated by either heightened partisan divisions or the importance of national issues rather than issues specific to a given state. Whatever the reason, as Tompkins (1988) pointed out, many states acted as these concerns were realized in electoral experience by moving to isolate their gubernatorial elections from presidential contests 2 .
(FIGURE 1 HERE)
1 Data, replication codes and supporting materials necessary to reproduce the numerical results in this paper will be made available online. Typescript).
The separation of these executive elections has largely contributed to a gap in the analysis of their electoral interactions (Tompkins, 1988) . Paradoxically, however, ever since the New Deal, the roles of state and national governments have become increasingly connected.
The executive officials of the U.S. political system, that is, the President and Governors of the fifty states engage in constant bargaining, while resources flow vertically on a regular basis.
Integrated parties, at least in theory, have been recognized as those political organizations most conducive to federal stability (Filippov et al., 2004; Bednar, 2009) . As Dyck (1991: 29) states, 'if a political party functions more or less successfully at both levels of government and if the relations between the two levels are generally close, it can be called an integrated party'. In the context of American federal institutions, these organizations assure the survival and success of co-partisans by coordinating the incentives of local and national elites.
As a result, this mutual dependence generates a long-term electoral coalition within the party and discourages intraparty conflict. Empirically, this two-way relationship implies that we are likely to observe 'two-sided' coattail effects (Zudenkova, 2011) as the possible observable outcome if the hypothesized correlation of incentives among politicians exists. This would mean that while a President's performance affects a Governor's reelection chances, a
Governor's performance could also affect how the President is evaluated in a given state.
Moreover, as Broockman (2009: 422) suggests, 'two-sided' coattail effects appear to be the logical expectation of the presidential coattail literature: 'if voters engage the availability heuristic in American elections, there should be spillover effects both up and down the ballot'.
Put it differently, 'there is nothing about the heuristic voting conceptually that indicates only presidential evaluation should tend to inform Congressional evaluations rather than the reverse too'. This paper brings both, integrated parties and coattails' literatures together, in order to explore the existence of reciprocal coattail effects in the context of American political institutions; that is, two-way spillover effects between same-party candidates running for different multilevel concurrent elections. To that end, we start by briefly discussing the role and characteristics of integrated parties in a long lasting federation as the United States. Then, we examine whether this relationship exists empirically. To conduct this analysis, we examine straight versus split ticket voting. We pay special attention to the role that partisanship and performance evaluations play in determining how integrated parties operate as an electoral cue for voters facing simultaneous elections. Consistent with the studies of coattails in Congress, we identify and measure the possible existence of reciprocal coattail effects between same party presidential and gubernatorial candidates in on-year elections since the beginning of the sixties.
Results endorse the expectations of this paper at the individual level and provide mixed but insightful results at the aggregate with regard to the multilevel organization of political parties in decentralized contexts. Finally, we review some of the implications of our results by emphasizing the relevance of exploring these synergic effects.
Federalism, Integrated Political Parties and Candidates' Mutual Dependence
Since Wheare (1946) and Riker's (1964) seminal works on federalism, political parties and their organization in multilevel government systems have been increasingly accepted, as the key variable to understand, not only the outcome of elites' bargaining, but also its stability and viability in the long term. As Riker asserts, 'the cause of variations in the degree of centralization (or peripheralization) in the constitutional structure of federalism is the variation in the degree of party centralization ' (1964: 129) . Hence, for Riker, federal stability and coherence would depend on two kinds of relationships with respect to parties: (I) the degree to which one party (electorally) controls both levels of government; and (II) the degree to which each potential governing party at the national level controls its partisan associates at the level of constituent governments (1964: 131 . Lately, most scholars conclude that the post-New Deal era raised a new type of federal ideal, the so-called 'marble cake' federalism, 3 The concept of integration in American political parties arises as a theoretical response to the institutional challenges faced by the responsible parties model (Cutler, 1998) ; that is, the paradox of the existing potential difficulties for unified control of government in the U.S. (the horizontal and vertical division of powers), and yet, the actual stability of its federalism. (Peterson, 1995) .
The new interdependent federal scenarios, in which Democrats and Republicans have adapted their strategy and party organizations, has far from weakened the states' position in the overall federal setting, strengthen their voice in national politics. Because the federal government depends on state administrators to oversee or implement so many of its programs, states have been able to use their position in the administrative system to protect their institutional interests in Congress (Kramer, 2000) . As an example, it has been recently demonstrated that states whose Governor belongs to the same party of the President receive more federal funds (Larcinese et al., 2006) . Following Riker's logic on the transfer of federal relations to relations within the party itself, in our opinion, this observable interdependence would explain the cooperative electoral incentives within same party elites in the American multilevel scenario. Consequently, since the party label can be thought of as a public good for all politicians at federal and state levels (Cox and McCubbins, 2005) , we follow Aldrich and others when asserting that the two major parties in the U.S. provide more support than any other organization for all but a very few candidates for national and state offices Kramer, 2000; Chhibber and Kollman, 2004) .
The Effect of Integrated Parties on Voting Behavior
For the intertwined incentives of co-partisans and integrated party strategies to matter at the polls though voters should be able to recognize the benefits of having same party candidates holding executive offices at different territorial levels. As the comparative literature working on 'vertical clarity of responsibilities' has concluded, federalism (and decentralization, more generally) makes the accuracy of policy attributions at the individual level more difficult (Cutler, 2004; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010) .
In any case, we believe that in an election in which voters confront scores of candidates about whom they have varying levels of information, the essential commodity possessed by candidates at lower levels is partisan label shared with popular candidates for national office (Filippov et al., 2004: 191) . Hence, party identification, regardless as to whether it operates as a long-standing psychological attachment (Campbell et al., 1960) or as a 'running-tally' of retrospective evaluation of parties' performance (Fiorina, 1981) , works as a necessary shortcut for voters when holding the multilevel governments accountable by exercising their electoral choice. Therefore, our story, in its more basic application to the individual level, is a simple one: partisan voters casting a straight ticket ballot when considering multiple offices simultaneously. To our knowledge, few systematic empirical researches exist addressing the question of straight/split ticket voting from an intergovernmental and vertical perspective 6 .
Therefore, our research builds on the specific body of theoretical and empirical work concerning individual level explanations for voting behavior in simultaneous elections.
(TABLE 1 HERE) compare the behavior of same respondents voting in on and off-year elections. As one might expect, straight ticket voting for both major parties was clearly the most popular strategy in both moments (87.59% in 2010, 92,14% in 2012) . However, the descriptive statistics in the table might also confirm that several other conditions prevented voters from behaving in such a way.
For instance, the level of ticket splitting during 2010 was almost 5 points higher than in 2012.
This fact suggests that factors such as the non-concurrency of elections or the idea of ideological balancing (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989; Erikson and Filippov, 2001; Erikson et al., 2012) could be affecting these results. For example, almost 50 per cent of those who split their ticket in 2010 voted a straight ticket in 2012.
Since the aim of this paper is to study coattails during concurrent elections, the 2008 and 2012 CCES 9 repeated surveys are used to model the individual decision to vote a straight ticket. Even if on-year elections are a much higher profile election types in terms of the available political information, and this causes ticket splitting to occur at a lower rate, we control for those individual, political, and institutional conditions that would promote such behavior in our analysis.
Individual characteristics refer to those respondents' features already identified by (Roscoe, 2003) . Among socio-demographics, we control for age, gender, race, education and income of the respondents following the classic claim of De Vries and Tarrance (1972: 61) about how the ticket splitter is 'slightly younger, somewhat more educated, somewhat more white-collar and more suburban than the typical middle class voter'. We also account for the role of respondents' political interest even if, as literature suggests, the effects of this variable tend to be mixed (Beck et al., 1992) .
Political conditions refer to the effect of ideology at state level. According to Erikson et al. (1989) , in the context of Presidential and Congressional elections, variation in the median voter across districts would make candidates of the same party to support different positions, depending on the spatial location of the median voter in that district. Consequently, the highest proportion of split ticket voting outcomes should be observed in ideologically extreme districts (Groffman et al., 2000) . While most of these arguments have been developed at the aggregate, the most likely location of incumbents of a given party varies with the ideological make up of the constituency (ibid. 37). As a result, we approximate this measure at the individual level by accounting for the absolute ideological distance between incumbent President and Governor as reported in 2012 by each respondent 10 .
Finally, we identify as institutional conditions two state-level characteristics that remain constant in the analysis, working as necessary fixed-effects: gubernatorial incumbency and straight-ticket ballot. Incumbency, as a candidate variable, has been identified, at least at the aggregate level, as a circumstance increasing the likelihood of observing ticket splitting (Burden and Kimball, 1998) while straight-ticket ballot accounts for those states 11 in which voting machines facilitate choosing the same party for every contested office, without considering other individual candidates out of the chosen ticket (Campbell and Miller, 1957; Beck, 1997) .
In line with our theoretical argumentation, we are interested in measuring what motivates intergovernmental executive straight ticket voting after controlling for the aforementioned conditions promoting individuals' split of the vote. Since incentives and electoral fates of co-partisans are interdependent, we argue that voters adopt a joint performance evaluation rule rather than an individual one (Zudenkova, 2011 (Zudenkova, : 1653 , punishing or rewarding the co-partisan candidates running for federal and state level executive offices. So, the general expectation here is that the individual partisan intensity and the approval of the incumbents (at both levels) will increase the probability of a voter choosing a straight ticket.
Consequently, we expect partisanship (a folded-measure of intensity, 0 to 4) to have a consistent, positive and significant effect on straight ticket voting. Naturally, we do not deny the possibility of observing the highest percentage of ticket splitters among moderate or independent voters (Campbell and Miller, 1957; Beck et al., 1992; Soss and Canon, 1995; Born, 2000) . Moreover, we presume that the probability of casting a straight party ballot will be also affected by evaluations on the performance of incumbents and their party affiliation. Therefore, we expect approval of incumbents to have a significant effect on straight ticket voting conditional on the party of the incumbent. In this sense, we follow Mondak and McCurley, who argue that coattail effects stem from the fact that voters search for efficiency in decision-making by turning to simple cues (partisanship and evaluation of performance) rather than engaging in an extensive deliberative process (1994: 153).
(TABLE 2 HERE)
The dependent variable is taken from the CCES questions about Presidential and Gubernatorial vote choices. Voters who cast a straight ballot are coded '1' while voters who cast ballots for two candidates from different parties are coded '0'. Since our argument is inherently partisan, the dependent variable needs to take into account the patterns for straight versus split ticket voting. Thus, the samples have been divided into Democratic and Republican presidential voters, and the models are used to predict whether voters within these groups vote for the gubernatorial candidate of the same party. Therefore, the DV for the first group is coded '1' for DD voting and '0' DOther voting. For the second group, it is coded '1' for RR voting and '0' for ROther voting (Roscoe, 2003) . Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, we specify probit models to conduct our analysis.
The estimation results are shown in Table 2 and graphed in Figure 2 . Where statistically significant, the coefficients for the socio-demographic variables suggest that older, wealthier and politically interested people tend to vote straight tickets more. Yet, the results are mixed and unstable. Incumbency and straight-ticket ballot show a more consistent and expected negative pattern on the probability of voting straight, though they fail to reach significance in all models. This is not the case for our measure of the ideological distance between Governor and President. As predicted, it has a negative and significant effect in 2012 suggesting that the bigger the difference between the perceived political position of the Governor and the President, the lower the probability of voting for the same party candidates. This unique and robust finding contributes to the confirmation of state ideological extremism as a clear threat for the electoral prospects of integrated parties.
(FIGURE 2 HERE)
Partisanship, which remains significant in all the specified models, confirms that the stronger the partisan attachment to one of the two main political parties in the U.S. the higher the probability of casting a straight ticket. In regard to Presidential Approval, we observe a Graphs above only show the effect for democratic presidential vote samples but the relationship also holds in the republican case. As we can infer from them, the marginal effect (which is the difference between both predicted probabilities) of increasing gubernatorial approval when the governor is democratic will be positive and significant, for lower levels of Clearly, as the approval of a democratic Governor increases, the chances of voting for a democratic straight ticket also increase.
Two-sided coattails at the aggregate level
Previous section has empirically confirmed the underlying individual level assumption in our theory. Then, if voters develop a joint performance evaluation rule when casting their ballot, it seems plausible to track such a voting pattern in the aggregate by accounting for the so-called 'two-sided' coattail effects (Zudenkova, 2011 (Zudenkova, : 1653 between the presidential and co-partisan gubernatorial candidates. Instead of only observing the classic unidirectional effect from the presidential side, it should be also possible to account for an additional theoretical implication, that is, the so-called 'reverse' coattails from same party gubernatorial candidates. Strictly speaking, presidential election outcomes could also be influenced, at the state level, by the presence of particularly strong (or weak) gubernatorial candidates.
Coattails are generally defined in literature as a spillover effect that describes situations in which an election for one office has an impact on an election for another one. More concretely, a coattail effect is defined as the tendency of a popular candidate at one level of government to attract votes to candidates from the same political party for other levels of government. Presidential coattail effects on congressional elections have been extensively scrutinized and results appear to be mixed. While abundant scholarship shows, empirically, the degree to which presidential coattails affect congressional elections in the U.S. (Born, 1984; Campbell, 1986) , these effects have also been contested because of the declining impact over time (Calvert and Ferejohn, 1983) . Additionally, it has been argued that the observed levels of coattail effects are conditional on candidacy status and quality (Mondak, 1993; Flemming, 1995) and on voters' attitudes (McCurley and Mondak, 1994 (Piereson, 1975; Chubb, 1988; Simon, 1989; King, 2001 ). These results though, have been challenged by those suggesting the existence of an economic voting hypothesis; in short, Governors', as state executives, are held accountable for the perceived state economic conditions (Atkeson and Partin, 1995; Niemi et al., 1995; Svoboda, 1995) .
As previously described, the decision to 'insulate state elections from national trends' (Bibby, 1983) has diluted the attempts to analyze the possible impact of national forces on state level races during on-year elections (Tompkins, 1988) . A few studies have approached the possibility of observing gubernatorial coattails on federal level Senatorial contests (Burns, 1999) or State legislative elections (Campbell, 1986; Hogan, 2005) . With respect to two-sided coattails though, Calvert and Ferejohn (1983) , and Broockman's (2009) work on Presidential and House candidates remain still as the few attempts in literature. Therefore, the theoretical and empirical propositions of this paper are novel by themselves. For their satisfactory analysis, we here follow Tompkins' (1988) , who suggested that the study of the bidirectional causation between the President and Governors 'requires a substantial model of presidential election outcomes at the state level (which has yet to be developed in the literature at this writing)'.
Testing for two-sided coattail effects: A non-recursive model
The high salience of presidential campaigns provides readily accessible information concerning candidates to voters. Presidential coattail heuristic is more or less effective depending on the nature of gubernatorial race competition; its influence should be potentially more perceivable in open-seat contests than in those with an incumbent. However, unlike presidential incumbency, gubernatorial incumbency is a diverse political practice that depends on the heterogeneous design of state executives' term limits (see Table 3 ). Accordingly, it is not rare to see an openseat race with a newcomer running against a former Governor, who had to leave the office due to specific term limits. What we argue here is that, depending on the election, voters hold differing levels of information about presidential and gubernatorial candidates, and consequently, attitudes toward gubernatorial candidates can be sometimes strong enough to overwhelm presidential coattails, and even, reverse them. For this reason, we focus our analysis on those 26 states that since 1960 have had, at least, one of their gubernatorial elections in a presidential election year.
( One of the key assumptions in OLS is that the explanatory variables and error terms are not correlated; this is violated in non-recursive models, and using OLS estimation can produce both bias and inefficiency in statistical results. According to Paxton et al. (2011), 2SLS and 3SLS provide identical results when the covariances among the equation disturbances are all zero or when they are exactly identified. The difference is between having a full-information or a limited-information model. So, reported results in Table 4 hold after running the model by using the 3SLS estimator. (Sovey and Green, 2011) .
(FIGURE 4 HERE)
Data
We use state-level data 14 from 1960 to 2012 that includes the two-party vote share for Governor and President. As it follows from Figure 1 , the number of states in the sample with on-year gubernatorial elections drastically decreases from 1960 to 1980, stabilizing after that point. Figure 4 provides the path diagram of our non-recursive model. There are two endogenous variables responding to each other: state level same-party vote shares for presidential and gubernatorial candidates in an election at time 't'. Estimating short-term coattails requires controlling for long-term electoral effects first (Magar, 2012: 387) . In order to do so and thus, account for parties' normal vote at state level, we introduce the lag of each party's vote share in both elections at 't-1'. Other than this control, we have two excluded and one common exogenous variable, and as a result of including these variables the model is specified, and overidentified.
Candidate Incumbency is a dummy variable indicating the specific status of the contenders in both of the analyzed multilevel elections: it takes the value of '1' if a candidate is holding office at the time of the election. The argument here follows previous presidential coattail literature; we basically assume that the amount of available information about incumbents decreases voters' need to rely upon their evaluations of presidential candidates, significantly attenuating the coattail effect or making it disappear entirely (Mattei and Glasgow, 2005; Koch, 2008; Broockman, 2009 ). In the case of the governorship, given the existing regulatory disparity with respect to term limits, the incumbent condition generates a source of variation that necessarily needs to be controlled. The second excluded instrument is the Candidate Campaign Spending. We follow previous studies on presidential coattails in 14 America Votes series congressional elections by accounting for candidates' effort (Born, 1984; Flemming, 1995) . In the case of Presidential campaign spending, we use data from the Federal Election Commission.
In the case of Gubernatorial campaign spending, we use the Gubernatorial Campaign Finance
Database (Beyle and Jensen, 2003) . Both range from 1980 to 2012 and thus, including them in the model relevantly decreases the number of observations. Finally, we use State Ideology as a common exogenous variable for both full models controlling for state specific preference characteristics. Berry et al.'s (2007) State Citizen Ideology measure is a 0 to 100 ideology-scale at state level (being 0 very conservative and 100 very liberal). Table 4 15 presents the results of our empirical analysis at the aggregate level for Democratic candidates in the sample 16 . In order to find out whether two-sided electoral spillover effects are observable, both endogenous variables, which are used as the main explanatory variables in each estimated individual equation, should have a positive and significant effect in each other, respectively. (TABLE 4 HERE) Paradoxically, and contrary to the previously mentioned reasoning behind the process of separating state executive elections from the federal one after the second half of last century, we find no significant presidential coattail effects at the state level for the election years within our sample. Even if the effect remains positive across models and alternative robustness checks, this null finding stands in sharp contrast to the significant and positive reverse gubernatorial 15 Models in Table 4 were also estimated for the subset of states holding on- This is the case of average citizen ideology -the only shared exogenous variable in both equations -which has a statistically significant positive effect in both models. As a state becomes more liberal, candidates of the Democratic Party increase their vote share in that state.
Findings
Since in our story, ideology is the connecting mechanism between voters and individual candidates, this result is also consistent with our expectations about reciprocal coattail effects.
The whole idea of coattails, at least in its long-term component, is to a large extent constrained by the distribution of preferences in a particular electoral constituency (Campbell, 1966) .
Results are also promising regarding the instrumental independent variables: they reasonably raise the general confidence on the correspondence between theoretical expectations and empirical evidence in this paper. (TABLE 5 HERE) This seems especially clear in Table 5 17 , where we also use candidates' campaign spending as another excluded exogenous variable in order to control for various levels of observable campaign efforts. As it can be observed, even after the evident decrease on observations (181 to 102), the consistency of reverse gubernatorial electoral spillover effects remains. Moreover, our results on Table 5 demonstrate that the amount of dollars that candidates spend for their campaigns has a positive and highly significant effect on their vote shares at both levels. As pointed out by the literature on Congressional elections, money makes a difference during elections, and in the context of Gubernatorial contests there is an important institutional variation in the amount of funding candidates can raise (Jensen and Beyle, 2003) .
More importantly, incumbency, which in Table 4 shows the biggest effect on candidates'
electoral results (around 11% increase in vote share in both contests), clearly decreases in Table   5 for the case of presidential candidates while remaining stable for gubernatorial ones. The results stress the influence of incumbency on gubernatorial candidates' electoral results, identifying a plausible explanation for the estimated limited effect of presidential coattails: the existing fair amount of information about local candidates as a consequence of the existing varying types of governor term limits, and thus, the heterogeneous levels of public exposure of these candidates to their constituencies 18 .
Conclusion
The relevance of the findings in this paper is twofold, providing meaningful insights for the study of the role of integrated parties for federal stability. Second, this article adds to the growing scholar evidence demonstrating that local forces also shape national aggregate election outcomes to important degrees in different comparative federal examples (for Argentina, see Jones, 1997; for Brazil, Ames, 1994 and Samuels, 2000;  for Germany, Hainmueller and Kern, 2008; for Mexico, Magar, 2012) . Consequently, as reported, a successful campaign for executive office at those states with on-year gubernatorial elections provides a significant vote bonus at state level to the co-partisan candidate running for Presidency. Undoubtedly, this result presents, unavoidable challenges for the classical understanding of how federal policy is designed, negotiated and approved at national level, and reinforces the idea that politicians are mutually dependent within integrated parties. In this sense, the lack of significant presidential coattails in our analysis does not only suggest that the political decision to isolate gubernatorial elections was based on an apparently unwarranted electoral concern, it also shows that, consistent with literature on congressional coattails, the existing heterogeneity in gubernatorial term limits can actually be restricting the effect of presidential campaign spillovers considerably (even after controlling for campaign spending). Other/Other and Other/R-D, even if not the specific theoretical target of this paper, account for those strategies in which individuals choose at least one candidate who does not belong to one of the two major parties. 
